Assessing interdependent operational, tactical and strategic risks for improved utility master plans by Luís, Ana et al.
1 
Assessing interdependent operational, tactical and strategic risks for 1 
improved utility master plans 2 
Ana Luís
1
, Fiona Lickorish
2
 and Simon Pollard
2* 
3 
1
EPAL, SA, Empresa Portuguesa das Águas Livres, Av. Liberdade, 24, 1250-144 Lisboa, 4 
Portugal, analuis@epal.pt  5 
2
Cranfield University, Cranfield, Bedfordshire, MK43 0AL, UK, 6 
f.lickorish@cranfield.ac.uk; s.pollard@cranfield.ac.uk  7 
*
Corresponding author: Tel: +44 (0)1234 754101; e-mail: s.pollard@cranfield.ac.uk 8 
Abstract 9 
Risk management plays a key role in water utilities.  Although risk tools are well-10 
established at operational levels, approaches at the strategic level are rarely informed by 11 
systemic assessments of the water supply and lack a long-term perspective.  Here, we report 12 
a baseline strategic risk analysis, founded on a systemic analysis of operational risks 13 
developed ‘bottom-up’ and validated in a large water utility.  Deploying an action-oriented 14 
research method, supported by semi structured interviews with in-house water utility risk 15 
experts, deep connections are established between operational risk and strategic risk that 16 
surpass those existing elsewhere in the sector.  Accessible presentational formats - 17 
influence diagrams, risk ”heat-maps” and supporting narratives are used to promote Board-18 
level risk discussions, and characterise a baseline set of strategic risks core to forward 19 
utility master planning.  Uniquely, the influence of operational events, exposures and 20 
potential harms, together with the mitigating measures in place to mediate these risks are 21 
linked to corporate objectives on business sustainability, profitability, water quality, water 22 
quantity, supply disruption and reputation. 23 
 24 
Keywords: Strategic risk analysis, interdependent risks, cognitive mapping, master planning 25 
2 
1. Introduction 26 
Managing risk well is a key competency for water utilities, and many utilities have 27 
established risk manager roles to coordinate their efforts (MacGillivray et al., 2006; Hrudey 28 
et al., 2006).  An essential requirement for utilities is to develop a preventative and 29 
anticipatory approach to risk and opportunity that ensures they are resilient to threats, 30 
whilst equally alive to opportunities (Pollard et al., 2013).  In practice, this means 31 
developing an organisational capability to connect operational activities to utility-wide risk 32 
management programmes; to understand the impact of risk on a utility’s corporate 33 
priorities; and then forecast future risks into the mid- and long term so stakeholders can be 34 
confident in the master plans designed to manage risk over the planning cycle.  A growing 35 
research agenda has developed around this need (MacGillivray and Pollard, 2008; Schiller 36 
and Prpich, 2013; Allan et al., 2013); one that straddles the engineering, decision and social 37 
sciences in the context of water utility management. 38 
One observation we have is that engineering and asset risk analyses, including the 39 
human dimensions of managing risk (Wu et al., 2009), rarely appear to inform strategic risk 40 
management activity directly.  Often, operational and strategic risk analyses are performed 41 
in isolation of one another for a host of reasons (e.g. the engineering versus a managerial 42 
focus), and there is rarely a truly systemic approach to assessing the water supply system.  43 
What can then occur is a potential disconnect between the view of strategic risk and the 44 
operational reality of risks in the business.  In seeking to address this deficiency, our 45 
research interest here is in how a systemic analysis of risk can inform the corporate 46 
priorities set by a utility now (in a baseline assessment) and then, by projecting risks 47 
forward in time, for decades to come - linking a utility’s thinking on risk and futures, as 48 
expressed by their master plans.  Can we better align operational and strategic risk to 49 
improve insight at the top of a utility, and then better inform long-term master planning? 50 
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Analytically, assessing the interdependencies between operational, tactical and 51 
strategic risk, and then projecting risks forward in time, is not straightforward and requires 52 
applied research to investigate how it can be achieved in a meaningful way that adds 53 
business value.  Intellectual contributions to this agenda are coming from the risk sciences 54 
(Lindhe et al., 2009), from the environmental assessment and water planning communities 55 
(Kumar et al., 2013) and from specialists in regulation and governance (Pegram et al., 56 
2009).  The broader goal of our research efforts over the last 10 years has been to improve 57 
the maturity of the water sector’s capabilities in risk governance; a principal motivation 58 
being to build stakeholder confidence in the sector’s capacity to manage the substantive 59 
changes it faces in the short-, medium - and long-term.  These include (i) dealing with 60 
multiple dimensions of risk and multidisciplinary knowledge; (ii) managing tightly coupled 61 
risk interdependencies; (iii) the pressing need for better cross-departmental communication 62 
on risk across business ‘silos’; and (iv) accepting high degrees of unresolvable decision 63 
uncertainty, due to the spatial and temporal variability of many utility risks. 64 
Here then, we present a novel approach to support strategic risk management in water 65 
utilities that employs a ‘bottom-up’ analysis, involves all levels of the organisation and that 66 
addresses interdependent risks in a systemic fashion.  The research tool was developed and 67 
tested in EPAL – Empresa Portuguesa das Águas Livres, the largest and oldest water 68 
supply company in Portugal.  We believe it has wide applicability across public, private and 69 
corporatized water utilities, and for asset rich organisations more broadly. 70 
2 Material and methods 71 
Our research deployed an action-oriented research framework (Coghlan and Brannick, 72 
2005) and a combination of methods, including (i) brainstorming (International Standards 73 
Organisation, 2009); (ii) observation, conversation, interviews and document analysis to 74 
generate qualitative data (Robson, 2002); (iii) cognitive mapping (Waal and Ritchey, 75 
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2007); (iv) semi-quantitative risk assessments (Pollard et al., 2004a; MacGillivray and 76 
Pollard, 2008); and (v) the development of risk visualisation tools (Prpich et al., 2013).  77 
This framework was deemed essential because of the need to process authentic risk data in 78 
a live decision context, using EPAL as the case-study.  Founded in 1868, EPAL supplies 79 
wholesale quality water to approximately three million people (more than one-quarter of 80 
the Portuguese population), as well as retail water to approximately 500 thousand 81 
inhabitants in the city of Lisbon.  With approximately 700 staff, EPAL has assets with a net 82 
fixed value of around 900 million EUR and has been generating profits of around 40 83 
million EUR.  Over recent years, structured risk management practices have been adopted 84 
at operational and tactical levels of decision-making at EPAL (e.g. health and safety 85 
procedures, water safety planning, capital investment planning, reliability centred 86 
maintenance), but an integrated approach for managing risks at the strategic level has been 87 
lacking. 88 
The team involved in this research encompassed a risk co-ordinator, the management 89 
Board (n=3), senior risk managers (n=14) and technical domain risk experts (n=24).  Senior 90 
risk managers were ‘Heads’ of the following departments at EPAL: asset management, 91 
planning and control, finance, customer relations, human resources, infrastructure 92 
maintenance, operations, water quality control, supply chain management, legal 93 
compliance, design and works, information systems, general secretariat, and organisational 94 
development.  External researchers from Cranfield University (n=5) had a discrete 95 
participation in the project, moderating group discussions in a one-day workshop. 96 
2.1 ‘Top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approach 97 
We employed a ‘top-down’ / ‘bottom-up’ approach to assess strategic risks, as 98 
depicted in Figure 1.  99 
 100 
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Figure 1 The “top-down” / “bottom-up” approach interconnecting operational and strategic 101 
risks 102 
The process was initiated at a strategic level, with the identification of EPAL's 103 
corporate objectives by the Board; it then cascaded down to tactical and operational levels, 104 
where risk managers and individual risk experts performed a systemic analysis of strategic 105 
risks; and finally, it escalated up to the strategic level again, for the assessment of the 106 
results by the Board. 107 
 108 
2.2 Corporate objectives identification 109 
EPAL’s corporate objectives were identified in a Board meeting.  Translating 110 
organisational values into corporate objectives is often not consensual, so a preliminary 111 
clarification of basic concepts was made, by distinguishing means objectives from 112 
corresponding fundamental objectives and from corporate, strategic objectives; the latter 113 
defined as the utility decision makers’ core objectives running through all utility decisions 114 
(Keeney, 1992). 115 
2.3  Systemic analysis of strategic risk 116 
Since strategic risks are those that express a likelihood and consequence of not meeting the 117 
corporate objectives of a utility, the model to assess strategic risks was based on the steps 118 
presented in Table 1. 119 
 120 
Table 1: Actions to build systemic model of strategic risks. 121 
 122 
2.3.1 Preliminary risk screening and securing buy-in 123 
6 
A workshop was held with the participation of risk managers, where the research 124 
project was explained and their role emphasized, thus contributing to securing their buy-in. 125 
Moreover, risk brainstorming was used to collect a broad set of ideas and a preliminary risk 126 
screening. The question posed was: “what do you consider to be the strategic risks of 127 
EPAL?”  128 
 129 
2.3.2 Preliminary influence diagram 130 
Responses from the brainstorming exercise were sorted into categories related to each 131 
corporate objective, and pathways that characterised threats to these were drafted by the 132 
risk co-ordinator; incorporating events (definable root cause activities by time and place), 133 
exposures (resulting from progressive challenge from one or more events) and harms 134 
(actual impacts, effects or consequences that result from one or more exposures; Gormley 135 
et al., 2011).  This exercise illustrated the interdependence of risks – individual risks impact 136 
on more than one corporate objective, may cascade from one another, sometimes with 137 
positive feedback.  These interactions were represented graphically, with causal factors and 138 
preventative barriers (the risk management measures in place to mitigate against the 139 
causation) identified.  To better characterise each of the components of the influence 140 
diagram, a complementary database was created, registering all relevant information 141 
associated with each event, exposure and harm.  The barriers in place along each pathway 142 
were pre-identified by the risk co-ordinator and the schema completed with inputs from 143 
supporting research studies related to one or more of the strategic risks (e.g. possible 144 
contamination of the main supply reservoir due to landslide in Panasqueira mine; seismic 145 
vulnerability of water tanks; reports from the pipe bursts’ research group; water quality 146 
modelling in the distribution network; risk based water safety and capital investment plans; 147 
etc.). 148 
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 149 
2.3.3 Pre-definition of the scales to assess likelihood and consequences’ magnitude  150 
Semi-quantitative scales were employed, regarded as defensible given the 151 
multidimensional nature of these risks (Altenbach, 1995; Andrews et al., 2003; Food and 152 
Agriculture Organisation and World Health Organisation, 2009).  A logarithmic scale was 153 
used to characterise the likelihood of an EPAL-specific consequence occurring in the 154 
following 18 months (starting in 2012), consistent with similar scales employed elsewhere 155 
for strategic risk appraisal (Food and Agriculture Organisation and World Health 156 
Organisation, 2009; International Standards Organisation, 2009).  Definition of the 157 
consequences scale requires value judgements specific to the organisation (Keeney, 1992; 158 
Renn, 2008).  Moreover, choosing a set of consequence attributes that comprehensively 159 
describes impacts whilst keeping the list of impacts concise enough to be understood 160 
constitutes a major challenge (Willis et al., 2004; Pollard et al., 2004b; Prpich et al., 2011).  161 
In this work, consequences were described by their type, extension (magnitude) and 162 
duration (including irreversibility) – “TED”.  Thresholds for these classes of consequence 163 
were defined, taking into account plausible worse case situations.  Taking the reliability of 164 
supply as example, we asked: “what would be the worst case of a critical infrastructure 165 
failure? Could it be considered ‘catastrophic’?”  We also considered the reaction time, or 166 
the so called risk ‘clock speed’ (Caldwell, 2012) – for example, the threshold of six months 167 
for the consequences of not having enough water to supply took into account the estimated 168 
time to implement new abstractions or transfers from other water sources or transport 169 
systems.  Finally, we considered the significance across all consequence categories.  Two 170 
options were analysed: (i) classifying all consequences on a Likert scale of 1 to 5 (Likert, 171 
1932) and then ranking the relative (pairwise) importance of the objectives, assigning 172 
weights and recalculating the value of each class; and (ii) reflecting the relative significance 173 
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of consequences on a matrix or risk “heat-map”, constructing a narrative for each strategic 174 
risk (Prpich et al., 2013).  The second approach was adopted, since it is easier for decision-175 
makers to understand. 176 
 177 
2.3.4 Meetings with risk managers 178 
Having completed the preliminary influence diagram as well as the preliminary 179 
definition of the likelihood and consequences’ scales, a series of 14 meetings was convened 180 
with each of the risk managers at EPAL, in order to elicit their feedback.  Risk managers 181 
were asked to appoint the risk experts in their teams that could provide more detailed 182 
information about the events, exposures, harms and the barriers along the pathways. 183 
 184 
2.3.5 Meetings with risk experts 185 
Following individual semi-structured interviews (n=12, ca. 2 hr. duration) with risk 186 
experts, the influence diagram was progressively enhanced, adding (and sometimes 187 
removing) events, exposures and harms and their respective interactions and control 188 
barriers.  Experts were asked to evaluate the likelihood of the events, exposures and harms 189 
to strategic risks, drawing on the conclusions of existing studies at EPAL and on empirical 190 
knowledge (Wall and Ritchey, 2007).  For example, the likelihood of occurrence of a 191 
severe drought was informed by a comprehensive study regarding climate change 192 
scenarios, impacts and adaptation, elaborated by four Portuguese universities for the water 193 
supply system of EPAL.  Experts’ comments and discussions were recorded in the database 194 
(Table 2). 195 
 196 
Table 2 Extract of influence diagram supporting database  197 
 198 
9 
2.3.6 Triangulation of the results and evaluation of the consequences of harms 199 
Triangulation of the interview results involved analysing all the information compiled 200 
during the interviews and by identifying inconsistencies and gaps.  The principal factors 201 
contributing to inconsistencies were either an incomplete understanding of the risks being 202 
analysed or of the supporting arguments for its characterisation.  These conflicts were 203 
resolved by a second-round of selected interviews with risk experts.   204 
Having stabilized the influence diagram and classification of the likelihood of events, 205 
exposures and harms, the risk co-ordinator assessed the consequences of harms, thus 206 
allowing the comparison of strategic risks in a “heat-map”.  These were represented by 207 
ellipses, where the length of the axes provides an indication of a mix of aleatory (due to the 208 
natural variability of the events) and epistemic (due to lacks in knowledge) uncertainties 209 
around the likelihood and consequences estimation (e.g. regulatory uncertainty, demand 210 
uncertainty).  Decision uncertainties were recorded in the database according to the 211 
following criteria (adapted from Gormley et al., 2011): 212 
 “Low” – there is empirical or scientific evidence; 213 
 “Medium” – there is no empirical or scientific evidence, but there is a high level of 214 
agreement among experts; 215 
 “High” – there is no empirical or scientific evidence and there is a low level of 216 
agreement among experts. 217 
 218 
2.3.7 Validation workshop 219 
Validation of the influence diagram and risks evaluation was achieved in a one-day 220 
workshop where groups of 8 to 10 people were formed, integrating the relevant risk 221 
managers and experts from different departments related to each of the strategic risks, as 222 
well as members of the research team, who facilitated the discussion.  Some minor 223 
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adjustments were proposed, such as renaming some of the events, exposures and harms to 224 
secure consistency, as well as their descriptions in the database records.  Furthermore, risk 225 
managers and experts were asked to evaluate the strength of the existing control barriers.  226 
The following questions were raised (a) has the analysis missed any existing barriers? If so, 227 
where?; (b) how effective are existing barriers at mitigating risk to EPAL’s corporate 228 
objectives?; (c) which barrier(s) are most critical?; (d) which barrier(s) are most vulnerable, 229 
irrespective of their effectiveness?; (e) should there be additional barriers in the system? 230 
 231 
2.3.8 Elaboration of final presentational documents 232 
The outcomes of the workshop enabled the risk co-ordinator to prepare the final 233 
documents for the Board, namely (i) the influence diagram and corresponding database; (ii) 234 
the risk “heat-map”; and (iii) one narrative per each strategic risk – a two-page document 235 
synthesising all the relevant information that led to the evaluation of the risk. 236 
 237 
3 Results  238 
3.1 General overview 239 
The overall result of this research is the development and validation of a novel holistic 240 
approach to assess risks at the strategic level, as expressed in Figure 1.  The outcomes 241 
include identification of six corporate objectives; the design of an influence diagram 242 
incorporating 29 events, 20 exposures and 12 harms to those objectives; the identification 243 
of 43 barriers along the pathways to risk; a supporting database with 66 records containing 244 
relevant information about the components of the influence diagram; and the elaboration of 245 
a “heat-map” to allow the comparison of the strategic risks’ evaluation, complemented by a 246 
narrative per each risk. 247 
 248 
11 
3.2 Corporate objectives identification  249 
In line with the financial, regulatory, physical and reputational water risks drawn from 250 
Orr et al. (2011), Morrison et al. (2010) and Levinson et al. (2008), corporate objectives for 251 
EPAL were to guarantee: ‘business sustainability’, ‘business profitability’, ‘adequate water 252 
quantity’, ‘adequate water quality’, ‘reliability of supply’ and ‘reputation and trust’, thus 253 
meeting the expectations of customers, shareholders and the regulator. 254 
 255 
3.3 Systemic analysis of strategic risk 256 
3.3.1 Likelihood and consequences’ scales 257 
The likelihood scale was defined in terms of occurrence / no. years, which fitted well 258 
given the type of events related to the strategic risks – Table 3. 259 
 260 
Table 3: Likelihood scale. 261 
 262 
The consequence scale is presented in Table 4, evidencing the corporate objectives’ 263 
values hierarchy (Vlek, 2013). For example, compromising “reputation and trust” as well as 264 
“business profitability” do not present “catastrophic” consequences when compared to the 265 
other objectives. 266 
 267 
Table 4: EPAL-specific consequences’ scale 268 
 269 
3.3.2 Systemic model – influence diagram 270 
Figure 2 shows the influence diagram for EPAL’s strategic risks, coloured 271 
according to the likelihood of events, exposures and harm. 272 
 273 
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Figure 2 Influence diagram for EPAL’s strategic risks, coloured according to the likelihood 274 
of events, exposures and harms 275 
 276 
The vertical bars spanning all strategic risks, prior to the remaining events, refer to 277 
low likelihood / high consequence events (earthquakes, tornados, flooding and terrorism).  278 
These present specific challenges, because through cascade effects, they may affect all 279 
corporate objectives.  They are often conceptually plausible but unpredictable (Cox, 2012; 280 
Renn, 2008) and their consequences may be ‘catastrophic and more devastating than 281 
envisaged’ (Vlek, 2013).  There are few control barriers robust enough to completely 282 
prevent exposures emanating from these events, thus risk management strategies differ 283 
from those for non-catastrophic events (Klinke and Renn, 2002), being addressed by 284 
contingency plans to assure business continuity (HM Treasury, 2004; Pollard et al., 2004b).  285 
Given the wealth of information contained in the diagram, it constitutes a powerful tool for 286 
analysis, as described in section 4.2, and it may be considered the main outcome of this 287 
research. 288 
 289 
3.3.3 Identification and characterization of barriers 290 
An important cognitive outcome of the workshop was the identification of existing 291 
barriers that were missing in the diagram, as well as the comprehensive characterisation of 292 
the barriers in terms of their efficacy, vulnerability and criticality.  The results were 293 
recorded in the database, allowing management practices and its relationship with strategic 294 
risks to be evaluated (Figure 3). 295 
 296 
Figure 3 Example of queries in the database supporting the systemic model, using the filtering 297 
function to highlight: (on the left) the critical barriers with maximal vulnerability and varying 298 
efficacy; and (on the right) the critical barriers which are most effective and less vulnerable  299 
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 300 
3.3.4 Evaluation of likelihood and consequence of risks 301 
Assessing a likelihood for each of the events, exposures and harms was captured in 302 
the semi-structured interviews with risk experts, the result conditional on the outcome of 303 
earlier steps in the diagram (Wall and Ritchey, 2007; Gormley et al., 2011) taking into 304 
consideration the efficacy of existing barriers (Pollino and Hart, 2008).  Moreover, the 305 
efficacy of existing barriers may be subject to factors (Hokstad and Steiro, 2006) as 306 
discussed in section 4.2.5.  The contributing factors identified in this research as well as the 307 
respective likelihood of occurrence (using the scale presented in Table 3) are indicated in 308 
Figure 4. 309 
 310 
Figure 4 Risk contributory factors’ likelihood 311 
 312 
The “heat-map” presented in Figure 5 resulted from the evaluation of the likelihood 313 
and consequence of the risks.  314 
 315 
Figure 5 “Heat-map” of EPAL’s strategic risks 316 
 317 
3.3.5 Strategic risk assessment 318 
A suite of risk schematics enabled rich discussions on risk management with the 319 
Board.  These included (i) the influence diagram, with and without the control barriers in 320 
place, providing the opportunity to emphasise their importance; (ii) the influence diagram 321 
coloured green, amber and red, reflecting the likelihood of the events, exposures and harms 322 
(Figure 2); and (iii) the ”heat-map” (Figure 5).  Supporting these visuals was a 323 
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comprehensive set of information in a database (allowing the production of individual 324 
forms; Figure 6), summarised as a narrative for each of the risks on the ”heat-map”. 325 
 326 
Figure 6 Influence diagram supporting database: example of an individual form 327 
 328 
4  Discussion 329 
4.1 Connecting operational, tactical and strategic risk 330 
Relationships between operational, tactical and strategic risk tend to be disjointed 331 
and interfaces between these risk types poorly informed (Strategy Unit, 2002; Allan et al., 332 
2013).  Many of the existing risk based approaches are developed at tactical (e.g. asset 333 
management) and operational levels (e.g. water safety plans) only, not reaching the 334 
strategic level (Wijnia and Herder, 2009).  Conversely, many strategic risk assessments are 335 
supported by external advisors who elicit risk appraisals from internal audiences, resulting 336 
in cursory analyses coordinated by the external party alone, often in isolation of deep 337 
organisational knowledge. 338 
The significance of the “top-down” / “bottom-up” approach employed in this 339 
research is clear.  Although the need to interconnect risk management at the three different 340 
levels has been acknowledged (Pollard et al., 2004a), practical illustrations of how this can 341 
be achieved are scarce.   Here, the “top-down” process initiated with the identification of 342 
the corporate objectives of the company.  This should be made prior to the discussions with 343 
risk experts, providing a focus for the analysis (Keeney, 1992).  Following Frigo and 344 
Anderson (2011), we considered strategic risks as those preventing an organization from 345 
achieving its corporate objectives.  Drawing on decision theory (Keeney, 1992), we also 346 
refer to ‘strategic, corporate objective’ – a decision maker’s ultimate end objective, which 347 
should be stable over years, as providing common guidance to all decisions; and 348 
15 
distinguished this from a ‘fundamental objective’ - an essential reason for interest in the 349 
decision situation; and from a ‘means objective’ - a means to achieve the fundamental 350 
objectives.  This is an important distinction because the semantics of the term ‘strategic’ 351 
quickly give way to different interpretations, such as ‘critical for the business mission’ or 352 
‘critical for accomplishing the strategies in place’, even though ‘strategic risks’ and ‘risks 353 
to the strategy’ do not have the same meaning.  Next, the process progressed with the 354 
identification and structuring of the fundamental objectives: “what are the immediate 355 
causes for guaranteeing this strategic objective?” (Keeney, 1992; Waal and Ritchey, 2007).  356 
We then combined the methods for structuring objectives with those for constructing 357 
influence diagrams to develop a systemic model incorporating the events, exposures and 358 
harms to those corporate objectives, where “harms” are associated with the consequences of 359 
failing to meet the fundamental objectives.  Despite the fact that identifying and structuring 360 
objectives is focused on those objectives to be attained, and the influence diagram is 361 
focused on what can happen that poses a threat to these objectives, both methods involve 362 
the identification of causal relationships and so can be combined to form a holistic model of 363 
strategic risks; understood here as the risk of not meeting the objectives.  Building the 364 
systemic model was an iterative process, moving back and forward until it was stabilized.  365 
This process was primarily informed by risk experts and risk managers and was 366 
complemented with an identification of the existing control barriers along the pathways 367 
from the events to harms and with the characterization of the barrier effectiveness, 368 
criticality and vulnerability. 369 
The process then addressed the strategic level again, through the evaluation of 370 
likelihood and consequence of the risks.  While the analysis of the likelihood associated 371 
with the events, exposures and harms was based on existing studies and on operational 372 
knowledge of the system (including the effectiveness of the existing barriers and the results 373 
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of risk analyses held for specific business functions), the consequence scale reflected the 374 
strategic character of the assessment.  Two main insights arose from this observation.  375 
Firstly, the consequence scale constitutes a critical issue in the linkage between strategic 376 
and operational levels, because “harms” may be realised several times without affecting 377 
strategic risks at all.  For example, pipe bursts happen every week in the city of Lisbon, but 378 
that does not compromise the objective “reliability of supply” from a strategic point of view 379 
– where consequences are expected to be much higher. Secondly, we turn to the 380 
controversial issue raised by MacGillivray and Pollard (2008), regarding whether risk 381 
analysis should be viewed as an over-arching discipline, normalised across the organization 382 
to fit a common format as advocated by the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) concept, 383 
or, instead be function-specific, fit for purpose.  The approach here represents a high-level, 384 
overarching risk analysis methodology, in the sense that it spans across all corporate 385 
objectives.  However, it does not claim to replace function-specific approaches (e.g. 386 
engineering; drinking water quality management; asset management; emergency 387 
management; occupational health and safety; financial analysis) that should be held at 388 
operational or tactical levels, but rather to evaluate their outcomes at a higher, strategic 389 
level of analysis.  390 
Implementing this process, engaging both the Board and risk experts, building the 391 
systemic model with identification and characterization of the existing barriers along the 392 
pathway and developing an appropriate scale of consequences for the strategic level to 393 
guide the risk assessment, can be considered key to addressing the challenge of connecting 394 
strategic with tactical and operational levels of risk management,  demonstrating how a 395 
‘golden thread’ connecting operational and strategic risk in organisations may be achieved.  396 
To our knowledge, no such approach has been implemented before. 397 
 398 
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4.2 The power of cognitive mapping 399 
4.2.1 Capturing risks interdependencies 400 
At the strategic level, risks are best assessed across a whole system (International 401 
Standards Organisation, 2009).  However, strategic risks have been appraised in isolation, 402 
leading to a growing recognition of the need to integrate and harmonize these analyses 403 
(Means et al., 2010; Hamilton et al., 2006; Renn, 2008; Larson et al., 2009; International 404 
Standards Organisation, 2009; Prpich et al., 2011).  Attempts to relate physical or 405 
environmental risks like water quality, supply and resource have existed for over a decade 406 
(Bouwer, 2000; Hamilton et al., 2006; Pollard et al., 2004b; Powers et al., 2012), but a step 407 
change is still required to further integrate physical water risks with regulatory, financial 408 
and reputational risks (Frigo and Anderson, 2012).  Despite the limited scientific literature 409 
on these water risks as a corporate concept (Orr et al., 2011), the ERM concept is gaining 410 
popularity (Hoffman, 2008) even though its practical implementation presents some 411 
weaknesses, as it does not take into account that most risks are interdependent (Schiller and 412 
Prpich, 2013; Caldwell, 2012).  413 
Recent developments in the COSO framework point out that “understanding risk 414 
interactions and then managing them requires breaking down ‘silos’” (Curtis and Carey, 415 
2012).  These authors suggest “a simple way to consider risk interactions is to group related 416 
risks into a broad risk area […] and then […] three explicit ways to capture risk interactions 417 
[…] are risk interaction maps, correlation matrices, and bow-tie diagrams”.  When applied 418 
to a broad risk area, typically in the field of engineering, these methods are effective ways 419 
to capture interactions between events, allowing the implementation of detailed 420 
probabilistic (quantitative) risk assessments (Lindhe et al., 2009; 2012).  However, at 421 
corporate level, interactions occur between several “broad risk areas”, including the ones 422 
related to business and reputational risks, making the application of these techniques 423 
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difficult for the global analysis.  Our systemic model, where interactions between physical, 424 
financial and reputational risks are captured and analysed using semi-quantitative methods 425 
addresses this challenge.  For example, ‘inadequate long-term planning’ was found to 426 
influence business sustainability (leading to poor resource allocation), business profitability 427 
(by making it difficult to secure returns on investments in case of asset overcapacity), water 428 
quality (in case of asset overcapacity) and water quantity (in case of asset under capacity).  429 
It should be noted that the semi-quantitative methods used in the approach allow the 430 
incorporation of fully quantitative risk assessments (e.g. those associated to the estimation 431 
of critical infrastructures’ failure).  432 
 433 
4.2.2 Establishing a multi-barrier approach 434 
Capturing the interactions between risks and establishing a multi-barrier approach to 435 
risk management is a tenet of good utility management in the water sector, since incidents 436 
are frequently characterised by multi-causality and interdependence in their effects (Pollard 437 
et al., 2013; Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004).  However, multi-barrier approaches are usually 438 
developed at operational levels and, to our knowledge, no such approach has been 439 
developed before at corporate level.  Existing methodologies, like COSO (2004), seek to 440 
identify controls for risk reduction, but these are appraised in isolation, not taking into 441 
account risks interdependencies.  Here, we identify existing control barriers and 442 
interdependencies expressed in the influence diagram.  A deep characterization of these 443 
barriers was deemed essential, because keeping them robust is the essence of risk 444 
management (Carter, 2012).  In this research, besides characterizing the control barriers in 445 
terms of their effectiveness and criticality (MacGillivray and Pollard, 2008), we also 446 
described them with respect to their vulnerability, because this constitutes a powerful input 447 
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to devise risk management strategies and priorities, supporting decisions from risk 448 
managers and the Board about which barriers should be reinforced, maintained and relaxed. 449 
 450 
4.2.3 Generating corporate knowledge for risk management 451 
Though initially developed with the purpose of recording the outputs of the semi-452 
structured interviews, the database constitutes a powerful tool for risk management, 453 
because it allows (i) the registering of the different inputs; (ii) the detection of 454 
inconsistencies between experts’ views; (iii) the statistical analysis of the control barriers 455 
(e.g. which barrier is the most frequent?); and (iv) the automatic production of records for 456 
each of the events, exposures and harms of the diagram (n=66).  Ultimately, the database 457 
enables the generation of traceable corporate knowledge.  For example, querying the 458 
supporting database (Figure 3) shows a number of critical barriers at EPAL that are not 459 
performing at their highest efficiency and that are highly vulnerable, such as increasing the 460 
water supply system flexibility, having readily available alternatives in case of a failure in 461 
the supply of chemicals and other materials, having robust contingency plans, etc., 462 
suggesting that management strategies should address these issues.  Additionally, Figure 3 463 
shows that keeping a good relationship with the media, maintaining the robustness of online 464 
monitoring (SCADA) and keeping water treatment plants efficient are the most effective, 465 
critical and less vulnerable barriers. 466 
 467 
4.2.4 The stable model enabling a dynamic appraisal 468 
By reference to existing methodologies, Vlek (2013) pointed out the need for a 469 
transactional model, where risks are not appraised in a static way, but in dynamic relation to 470 
internal controls.  Our approach meets Vlek’s call for such a model, because though the 471 
influence diagram should remain stable for many years – since corporate objectives are set 472 
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for the long term – the systematic revisiting of existing barriers provides the dynamism, 473 
countering complacency which is one of the major causes of incidents (MacGillivray and 474 
Pollard, 2008; Carter, 2012).  We suggest that the influence diagram should be revised with 475 
the same frequency as that of the utility master plan (in EPAL: every 10 years), whereas the 476 
efficacy, vulnerability and criticality of the barriers should be challenged within a one to 477 
three year period.  We highlight that the influence diagram enables the process to be 478 
transparent and repeatable under the same basis of analysis, which is a proxy for its 479 
credibility (Wiedemann et al., 2013; Food and Agriculture Organisation and World Health 480 
Organisation, 2009; International Standards Organisation, 2009; Hokstad and Steiro, 2006). 481 
 482 
4.2.5 Informing the likelihood estimation of strategic risks 483 
The influence diagram plays an important role in estimating the likelihood of 484 
strategic risks.  Firstly, the causality between events, exposures and harms, as well as the 485 
characterization of existing barriers and the factors that inform the likelihood of risks, 486 
differs from existing strategic risk frameworks that focus on the likelihood of harms 487 
regardless of the underlying processes, impeding risk reduction measures being targeted at 488 
their root causes (MacGillivray and Pollard, 2008).  Secondly, a visualisation of the 489 
influence diagram (Figure 2) allows an intuitive distinction between risks with a natural 490 
low likelihood – e.g. “Water Quantity” – and those where the likelihood is low due to the 491 
maintenance of control barriers – e.g. “Water Quality”.  This is an important observation, 492 
because focusing only on the likelihood of risks in isolation of why they are low, might 493 
lead the Board to pay less attention to the maintenance of barriers. 494 
We also highlight the inclusion of risk factors in the analysis, i.e. contributing 495 
factors that may alter the respective likelihood (Hokstad and Steiro, 2006; International 496 
Standards Organisation, 2009).  Whilst not novel, the fact these were assessed separately 497 
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from the events, exposures and harms represents a different approach from ERM 498 
frameworks, which allow for secondary risks to be added directly in the analysis.  In fact, 499 
rather than being considered as initiating events that pose harm to strategic risks, these 500 
factors act as “meta-risks”, affecting the robustness of existing barriers and, consequently, 501 
the likelihood of events, exposures and harms.  For example, in this research keeping 502 
abreast of asset management best practice might be viewed as a highly vulnerable barrier 503 
influenced by “poor human resources management”, given that 200 out of the 700 504 
employees (approximately) of EPAL are aged 55 or more, thus being expected to retire 505 
within the next ten years.  No transmission of knowledge to new employees is foreseen, due 506 
to legislative measures that impede state owned companies recruiting new staff.  This could 507 
have an adverse impact on diverse exposures and harms to strategic risks (Wu et al., 2009). 508 
 509 
4.2.6 A natural starting point for discussion with the Board 510 
A further strength of the influence diagram is that it constitutes a natural starting 511 
point for discussions between the Board and risk managers.  Ultimately, the influence 512 
diagram is used to inform a Board, who are not expected to perform a detailed analysis of 513 
enterprise risk, but rather to oversee what drives strategic risk and ensure these drivers are 514 
managed, which is often the most challenging and important aspect of oversight (Caldwell, 515 
2012). 516 
 517 
4.3 “Heat-map” as a basis for discussion 518 
Despite the strengths of the influence diagram, it does not show the consequences 519 
associated to risks.  Hence, there is still a need to construct a “heat-map”, presenting the 520 
evaluation of likelihood and impact of each strategic risk, which, in this research, was 521 
depicted by the central position of an ellipse, where the length of the vertical and horizontal 522 
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axes reflect a mix of aleatory and epistemic uncertainty of the respective assessment.  We 523 
avoided the use of risk matrices where risk would be tightly classified as ‘high’, ‘medium’, 524 
‘low’ or similar, because of the variety of data and the respective range of uncertainty the 525 
nature of this analysis embodies (Cox, 2008).  Instead, the ‘heat-map’ is offered as a high-526 
level risk diagram that enables a Board to compare the relative positioning and size of the 527 
risk ellipses, and to promote discussion, supported by narratives on the character of the risk 528 
and the effectiveness of current risk management strategies (Prpich et al., 2013).  Of 529 
course, beneath each risk ellipse there is a golden tread of data and information resulting 530 
from an analytic-deliberative approach that encompasses a synthesis of scientific expertise 531 
and value orientations (Klink and Renn, 2002; Willis et al., 2010). 532 
 533 
4.4 Deliberative approach, enhancing organizational risk culture and avoiding bias 534 
Both in risk management and in futures’ planning, the process through which 535 
decisions are achieved is as important as the strategies themselves (Wack, 1985 in 536 
Brummell and Greg MacGillivray, 2008; Koivisto et al., 2009).  Although these two 537 
aspects overlap, the framework developed in this research provides a holistic, systematic 538 
way to manage strategic risks, and the process affords a transparent and structured means to 539 
engage diverse expert and stakeholder perspectives in judging the implications of risk 540 
information (Powers et al., 2012).  This research employed an action-oriented approach, 541 
involving various levels of the organization (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005) because the 542 
setting of corporate objectives suggested almost every department at EPAL should be 543 
involved in the analysis. The value of conducting this in ‘testing mode’, unfolds in various 544 
ways. 545 
First, it requires high levels of engagement among the researcher’s colleagues 546 
which, despite being hugely challenging to undertake (Coghlan and Brannick, 2005), 547 
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contributes to raising risk management awareness and pervasiveness in the company (Allan 548 
et al., 2013).  This research confirmed that the involvement of the Board from the 549 
beginning, as well as the knowledge the researcher had of the organization – two of the 550 
key-drivers for successful ERM implementation (Frigo and Anderson, 2011) – proved 551 
pivotal to securing the necessary commitment from risk experts and to implementing the 552 
methodology, promoting dialogue and making adjustments when necessary. 553 
Secondly, this approach allowed the unveiling of tacit risk knowledge, alongside 554 
formal codified information, contributing to knowledge generation.  Stakeholder 555 
consultation is a golden opportunity, forming one of the key outputs of the risks and futures 556 
approaches involving people networking, where the developed knowledge is more than the 557 
sum of its elements (Koivisto et al., 2009).  Furthermore, by engaging a wide range of 558 
Departmental managers, this process contributes to breaking down ‘silos’, which are crucial 559 
to implementing risk management in organizations (MacGillivray and Pollard, 2008; 560 
Summerill et al., 2010; Allan et al., 2013).  The EPAL case-study showed this process 561 
helped unifying the assumptions about the performance of the system across the different 562 
departments, including the destroying of some myths.  For example, it was thought that the 563 
two free-surface flow trunk mains presented a very high likelihood of contamination, but 564 
the investigation carried out by the water quality risk experts under this research showed 565 
that the number of water quality non-compliances with legal requirements over recent years 566 
was negligible on these trunk mains. 567 
Finally, the approach can provide high levels of political confidence that there is a 568 
firm understanding (and active management) of strategic risk within the company, now and 569 
for the future.  This said, the action research approach may lead to some bias, as well.  570 
Maxwell (2009) calls attention to the fact that despite the inherent advantages, bringing the 571 
experience and knowledge of the researcher into the research may lead to distortions in the 572 
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methods and in the interpreting of the results. On the other hand, there is also the possibility 573 
for cognitive bias in the assessment of causal chains, barriers and their effectiveness by risk 574 
experts and managers, either by failing to recall relevant events, by misperceiving causal 575 
chains (Vlek, 2013) or even by exaggerating or underplaying the likelihood and 576 
consequences evaluation (Slovic, 1998; Renn, 2008).  Furthermore, ‘group think’ (as it 577 
happened in the validation workshop) may cause less vocal participants to be dominated by 578 
opinionated leaders (Vlek, 2013; Powers et al., 2012) and while individual interviews 579 
reflect consistent and coherent opinions (even if deliberately exaggerated), the need to 580 
reach consensus in a group may cause opinions to become incoherent (Cox, 2012).  581 
In this methodology, the researcher adopted a “critical subjectivity” attitude 582 
(Reason, 1988 in Maxwell, 2009), i.e., an awareness in which her primary experience was 583 
not suppressed nor allowed to overwhelm the research, but rather seen as raising 584 
consciousness and used as part of the process.  Given the interactions among strategic risks, 585 
experts from different departments critically analysed the same risks, which smoothed 586 
possible biases.  Triangulation of the results allowed the detection of inconsistencies, which 587 
were subsequently solved.  Then, transparency and validation were assured by joining 588 
managers and experts from different departments in the same groups and by providing each 589 
group with the same influence diagram and set of records characterizing the events, 590 
exposures and harms associated with the strategic risks.  Positive group dynamics (Johnson 591 
and Johnson, 2000) was secured by external researchers who moderated each group.  592 
Given the extent of validation achieved through what Maxwell (2009) refers to as 593 
intensive, long-term involvement of the researcher; gathering “rich” data; validation of 594 
responses by peers and triangulation; we claim that this approach minimizes the possibility 595 
for bias - which is also a proxy for the credibility of risk assessments (Wiedemann et al., 596 
2013). 597 
25 
 598 
4.5  Evolving strategic risk 599 
Corporate objectives do not vary from day-to-day.  They should be stable over years 600 
(Keeney, 1992).  Master planning in utilities should therefore aim for the mid and long-601 
term, and this is particularly more relevant for the water sector, where the assets are 602 
designed to last around 25 to 50 years.  Therefore, we have complemented the methodology 603 
presented here to include an assessment of how these baseline risks may evolve in the long-604 
term, including an extension of the visualisation tools to improve communication with the 605 
Board.  This analysis will be offered in a future communication. 606 
5  Conclusions 607 
The demonstrable management of risk and opportunity - expressed by a pragmatic and 608 
positive organisational commitment to risk management across the portfolio of risks that a 609 
utility faces - has become an expectation of responsible utility management.  By assessing 610 
the interconnectedness of operational, tactical and strategic risks, and representing them 611 
using accessible visuals that executives and Boards can engage with, this analysis is shown 612 
to be of value in appraising the multiple threats to corporate objectives.  This forms a 613 
clearer basis for water utility master plans that, in part, provides assurance to stakeholders 614 
that threats (and opportunities) can be managed by progressive and resilient water utilities. 615 
The approach was successfully tested at EPAL, which suggests a potential for 616 
replication in other water utilities or sectors.  We speculate that: (i) strategic objectives will 617 
not differ much from water utility to water utility; recognizing utilities from other sectors 618 
may have different strategic objectives; (ii) the influence diagram, as well as the definition 619 
of the consequences‘ scale, is EPAL-specific, although they are easily adaptable to other 620 
water utilities; in other sectors, relevant events, exposures and harms are expected to 621 
significantly change, but the base concepts of the approach developed may be applied.  All 622 
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this implies that although context is crucial, it is possible to generalize the lessons from this 623 
case study in a wider range of utilities. 624 
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Figure 1 The “top-down” / “bottom-up” approach interconnecting operational and strategic risks  791 
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 796 
 797 
35 
Figure 2 Influence diagram for EPAL’s strategic risks, coloured according to the likelihood of 798 
events, exposures and harm. 799 
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 801 
BARRIERS
Efficacy
(1=best)
Vulnerability
(1=less)
Criticality
(Yes/No)
- AM (asset management) best practices 1 5 Y
- Business continuity - contigency plans 3 5 Y
- C.Bode reservoir management commission 3 5 Y
- Increase system's flexibility 3 5 Y
- Ready available alternatives 5 5 Y
- Relation with EDP 3 5 Y  
BARRIERS
Efficacy
(1=best)
Vulnerability
(1=less)
Criticality
(Yes/No)
- Media relationship 1 1 Y
- Online monitoring 1 1 Y
- WTPs' efficiency 1 1 Y  
 802 
Figure 3 Example of queries in the database supporting the systemic model, using the filtering 803 
function to highlight: (on the left) the critical barriers with maximal vulnerability and varying 804 
efficacy; and (on the right) the critical barriers which are most effective and less vulnerable. 805 
 806 
 807 
 808 
RISK FACTOR LIKELIHOOD RATIONALE
Inadequate data / 
information
High
(1/10 – 1/1)
•Not enough accurate or available data
•Difficult to extract information out of data
Legal non-compliance
Moderate
(1/100 – 1/10)
•Compliance with laws
•Lack of stability in laws
Lack of communication
Certain
(1/1)
•Within departments
•Between departments
•Outside the company
Poor HR Management
Certain
(1/1)
•Difficult knowledge transfer (more than 
200/740 employees are aged 55+)
•Difficult to capture talents
Inadequate governance
Moderate
(1/100 – 1/10)
• Excessive and unstable rulemaking from 
government
 809 
Figure 4 Risk contributory factors’ likelihood  810 
 811 
 812 
Figure 5 “Heat-map” of EPAL’s strategic risks. 813 
 814 
37 
1 
Competition in water supply  
Event 
Municipalities may start producing their own water (in case the price of water gets 
too high for them, for example) 
Influenced by: 
n/a 
with the following barriers: 
n/a  
Probability class:  Moderate (1/100 - 1/10)                    Confidence: High 
- 
Impact on: 
6 - Loss of monopoly (Exposure) 
with the following barriers: 
- Contractual safeguards (E=3, V=4, NC) --> 6 
- Competitive advantadges (E=2, V=2, C) --> 6 
Related with the following strategic risk(s):  
Business Sustainability compromised 
 815 
Figure 6 Influence diagram supporting database: example of an individual form 816 
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Table 1: Actions to build systemic model of strategic risks 822 
 823 
Step 
# 
Action Basis of the action People involved Time frame 
1 
Preliminary risk screening and 
securing buy-in from Risk Managers 
Brainstorming 
Risk co-ordinator 
+ Risk Managers 
April 2011 
2 
Identification of the events, exposures 
and harms to each corporate objective 
and of the respective interconnections  
(preliminary influence diagram). 
Knowledge of the 
system; Existing 
studies; Literature 
review. 
Risk co-ordinator 
Feb.  2012 /    
Nov. 2012 
3 
Pre-definition of the scales to assess 
likelihood and consequences' 
magnitude. 
Knowledge of the 
system; Literature 
review. 
Risk co-ordinator 
Feb.  2012 /    
Nov. 2012 
4 
Meetings with Risk Managers, in order 
to elicit feedback of the: 
 systemic analysis; 
 likelihood and consequences' 
scales; 
 risk experts to be appointed. 
Preliminary 
influence diagram;  
Preliminary 
likelihood and 
consequence scales.  
Risk co-ordinator 
+ Risk Managers 
Nov. 2012 
5 
Meetings with Risk Experts, in order 
to: 
 Discuss the influence diagram; 
 Evaluate the likelihood of each 
risk. 
Existing studies; 
Expert knowledge. 
Risk co-ordinator 
+ Risk Experts 
Nov. 2012 /     
Jan. 2013 
 
6 
Triangulation of the results: 
compilation of the information 
gathered during the meetings with Risk 
Experts and identification of 
inconsistencies or gaps. 
Evaluation of the consequences 
associated to the strategic risks. 
Information 
gathered in step 5 
Risk co-ordinator Jan. 2013 
7 
Workshop with Risk Managers and 
Risk Experts in order to: 
 Validate the influence diagram; 
 Validate the likelihood and 
consequences evaluation; 
 Discuss the completeness, 
efficacy, criticality and 
vulnerability of the existing 
barriers. 
Information 
gathered in the 
previous steps 
Risk co-ordinator 
+ Risk Experts + 
Risk Managers + 
External 
researchers 
Jan. 2013 
8 
Elaboration of the final documents, 
including: 
 Narratives (one per each risk); 
 Influence diagram (final version); 
 Risk "heat-map".  
Outcomes of the 
workshop 
Risk co-ordinator 
Feb. 2013 /     
May 2013 
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Table 2: Extract of influence diagram supporting database 832 
 833 
No. Box Type Evidences Notes Likelihood Likelihood 
Notes 
1 Competition 
in water 
supply 
Event Experience 
with Águas 
do Oeste 
Municipalities may start 
producing their own water (in 
case the price of water gets 
too high for them, for 
example). 
Department A: 
1/10 - 1/100 
Department B: 
1/10 - 1/100 
- 
 834 
 835 
Table 3: Likelihood scale 836 
 837 
Likelihood 
classification  
Occurrence per nº of 
years 
Certain 1/1 
High 1/10 – 1/1 
Moderate 1/100 – 1/10 
Low 1/1000 – 1/100 
Very low 1/10000 – 1/1000 
 838 
Table 4: EPAL-specific consequences’ scale 839 
 840 
 Quality Reliability Quantity Sustainability Profitability Reputation 
Catastrophic 50 or more 
customers will 
present non-
reversible 
health 
problems, 
including the 
possibility of 
death 
2.0 
million or 
more 
customers 
will not be 
supplied 
at all 
during 4 
days or 
more 
50% or 
more of 
the daily 
average 
flow will 
not be 
supplied 
during 6 
months or 
more 
The company 
will not be 
able to 
accomplish its 
mission in the 
next 10 years 
  
Very bad Less than 50 
customers will 
present non-
reversible 
health 
problems, 
including the 
possibility of 
death OR 
more than 
5000 customers 
will present 
reversible 
health 
problems 
0.1-2.0 
million 
customers 
will not be 
supplied 
at all OR 
2.0 
million or 
more 
customers 
will be 
partially 
supplied 
during 4 
days or 
more 
50% or 
more of 
the daily 
average 
flow will 
not be 
supplied 
during 1-6 
months 
The company 
will not be 
able to 
accomplish its 
mission in the 
next 20 years 
The 
company 
will be in 
deficit 
One breaking 
news  OR 
more than one 
non breaking 
news per year 
defaming the 
quality of the 
water supplied 
Bad Less than 5000 
and more than 
500 customers 
0.1 
million or 
less 
25%-50% 
of the 
daily 
The company 
will be able to 
accomplish its 
The 
company 
will 
One breaking 
news  OR 
more than one 
40 
will present 
reversible 
health 
problems 
customers 
will not be 
supplied 
at all OR 
0.5-2.0 
million 
customers 
will be 
partially 
supplied 
during 4 
days or 
more 
average 
flow will 
not be 
supplied 
during 6 
months or 
more 
mission in the 
next 20 years 
but will 
struggle with 
high 
economic or 
financial 
constraints 
decrease its 
profits by 
more than 
75% up to 
100% 
non breaking 
news per year 
related to 3rd 
party or H&S 
injuries 
Moderate Less than 500 
and more than 
50 customers 
will present 
reversible 
health 
problems 
0.1-0.5 
million 
customers 
will be 
partially 
supplied 
during 4 
days or 
more 
25%-50% 
of the 
daily 
average 
flow will 
not be 
supplied 
during 1-6 
months 
The company 
will be able to 
accomplish its 
mission in the 
next 20 years 
with moderate 
economic or 
financial 
constraints 
The 
company 
will 
decrease its 
profits by 
more than 
25% and 
less than 
75% 
One breaking 
news  OR 
more than one 
non breaking 
news per year 
defaming the 
reliability of 
the water 
supplied 
Minor Less than 50 
customers will 
present 
reversible 
health 
problems 
0.1 
million or 
less 
customers 
will be 
partially 
supplied 
during 4 
days or 
more 
Less than 
25% of 
the daily 
average 
flow will 
not be 
supplied 
during 
more than 
1 month 
The company 
will be able to 
accomplish its 
mission in the 
next 20 years 
with minor 
economic or 
financial 
constraints 
The 
company 
will 
decrease its 
profits by 
less than 
25% 
One breaking 
news  OR 
more than one 
non breaking 
news per year 
defaming the 
governance of 
the company  
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